


The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505



15 January 1981

Editor
Armed Forces Journal International
Suite 603
1414 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Sir:

In your January edition, you carried an extensive article on American intelligence. The author chose to use a pseudonym. Perhaps he did this to permit himself to criticize others without subjecting himself to counter-criticism; perhaps he did this simply not to disclose the fact that he lacked credentials (though that was apparent from the text).

For instance, he alleges that I engaged a retired general officer to review the entire codeword system of American intelligence; that I gave him four days to do this; and that it took four months. The only correct fact is the number "four." I asked the officer to do this in four weeks; he did it in four weeks.

The author further alleges that this officer reported to me that neither he nor I had the appropriate clearances to read all of his report. This is utterly untrue. It also discloses how little the author understands of the intelligence process. A Presidential Executive Order in effect stipulates that no codewords can be established within the Intelligence Community without the authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The DCI, therefore, by definition has access to all codewords in intelligence and can further authorize their disclosure as he deems appropriate.

I can't think of an article on intelligence that was less well informed, more logically inconsistent, or larded more heavily with meaningless generalities. I would suggest that in the future you do a better job of checking the credentials of your contributors who do not have the guts to stand up to the criticism the quality of their work deserves.

Yours sincerely,


STANSFIELD TURNER

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Intelligence: The Reagan Challenge

by Justin Galen

THE ELECTION OF RONALD REAGAN has given the American intelligence community a desperately needed reprieve from its "slow murder" at the hands of the Carter Administration. It has meant not only the imminent departure of the Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, but a stay of execution from the debilitating web of "reforms" that was beginning to strangle virtually every major intelligence activity. For the first time in years, it is now possible to consider what intelligence should be, rather than how to improve its moral behavior or how it can best be dominated by a single personality.

It is essential, however, that the Reagan Administration do more than simply try to "revitalize" the old intelligence community, or shift its existing structure to support new policies. American intelligence cannot function effectively by repeating its past. It does not need to go back to its old methods of estimation and analysis; it needs new ones. It does not need the clandestine services of the 1960s and 1970s; it needs new ones. In short, it needs to move forward, and not simply to repair the damage of the last few years.

Intelligence: The Reagan Challenges

This will not be a simple task. On the one hand, many of the men who have fought hardest to defend the community over the last half-decade have never really prepared themselves to consider what intelligence must be in the future. On the other hand, the list of challenges the new Administration faces are long and grim:

- A new approach to analysis is needed. The President does not need a single best view, a guru, or a prophet; the nation needs the best analysis of the full range of views and data it can get.
- A new approach must be taken to the "fusion" of information from all sources. The "barrier" between intelligence and the rest of the National Security Community must be eliminated.
- Net assessment activity must be revitalized and made the core of the estimative process. This must include joint efforts by the intelligence community and the user, and a new focus on allied and third world nations.
- A strong outside advisory board must be established to replace the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and Senior Review Panel, with an input from the best minds available. Smaller, more specialized, outside advisory bodies are needed to ensure that all key intelligence activities constantly have an input from the outside world.
- An end must be put to centralization that saves no funds, and which progres-

sively orients all intelligence activity toward allowing one man to compete for the ear of the President. The theaters, and unified and specified commands, need dedicated and survivable assets. The military Services, the Departments, and the Agencies need resources they can control. DIA and CIA need to be allowed independence, and some degree of duplication. Similarly, the user needs the "control" imposed by allowing independent analysis by the other members of the community.

- The present Intelligence Community Staff must be reformed, the present mix of half-informed outsiders and intelligence hacks and rebrands needs to be dismissed, and a better balance established between central review and the need for decentralized activities that are user-oriented and dominated.

The President does not need a single best view, a guru, or a prophet; the nation needs the best analysis of the full range of views and data it can get.

- The current farce taking place in allocating collection assets must be ended, along with the Collection Tasking Staff, and it must be replaced with something that serves the user, not the collection manager.
- The problem of space boosters and survival must be re-examined, and the necessary number and diversity of launch vehicles provided.
- The focus on centralized space systems must be replaced with the proper balance of theater and national systems, and new forms of human intelligence (humint).
- The disaster that has resulted from the effort to integrate all "C²I" activities in a way that gives precedence to technology over function, nets everything in sight, and relies in large part on the Worldwide Military Command Communications System (WWMCCS), needs a transition "pink slip." C²I is precisely the kind of "high tech" that the nation does not need.
- A new clandestine operations service must be established in close cooperation with the Special Operations elements in the military. It must be professional, have tight Presidential control, be subject to forced early retirement, and made independent of humint and clandestine collection.
- A problem of counterintelligence needs a solution that will effectively link the CIA, NSA, and FBI, and put an end to the inter-agency feuding, ego trips, and show-boating that have often wasted the

efforts of the few professionals in the field.

- A way must be found to inform the American people that will keep them informed of major developments which affect their security, which would be superior to the constant use of Freedom of Information requests.

Not only William Casey, but all the senior officials involved in this aspect of the Reagan Administration should recognize from the start that none of these intelligence challenges can be met simply by returning to the "status quo ante Turner" or even "ante Vietnam." They can only be met by a new approach to the whole concept of intelligence.

Ending the "Mystique" of Intelligence

Intelligence analysis has suffered sharply in the last few years from poor middle managers, and inadequate training and numbers of personnel. It has also suffered from a lack of competitive career advancement opportunities and the loss of skilled professionals, and from efforts at over-coordination and over-centralization. All of these problems need attention under the new Administration.

At the same time, intelligence analysis has long been crippled by its own "mystique." It has been oversold as a definitive source of secret wisdom, when it is nothing more than the product of the material obtained through special collection means with vast inherent gaps and limitations as written up by junior and medium grade civilians and officers. Intelligence "products" or reports are also weakened by every other problem in the chain of intelligence collection to production, and—in most cases—by the fact that the few analysts covering a given area are grossly overworked, no better than any other group of professionals, and are kept isolated from much of the traffic and data available to policymakers.

Further, the cadre of analysts on which the intelligence product depends for its quality is incredibly small for the number of issues and tasks it must deal with, and has had little recent continuity. Although its training has improved in recent years, many countries are not covered by even one full-time analyst, and there is a gross shortfall of analysts who speak the language of the country they study and who have any direct area expertise in the nations they cover.

While the new Administration can improve the resources available for intelligence analysis, it can only do so slowly, and they will never be fully adequate. The world is much more complex than it was in 1945, or even 1960. Today, small countries can burst into importance for a period of months, and then sink with equal sud-

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denness into total obscurity. Even if the US could afford enough collection assets to cover all these countries and regions, it would be a practical impossibility to create a mix of warning, current intelligence, and estimate capability to cover every possible contingency or strategic interest of the US.

This inevitably means the the US intelligence community will always be mediocre if it is asked to assume the full burden of warning, analysis, and estimation. It will always fail the policymaker and the military, and be the inevitable and unimprovable scapegoat for each new crisis. Intelligence can never stand alone in the modern world.

Organizing Intelligence to Face Reality

The Reagan Administration cannot afford the luxury of glorifying the intelligence process. It must instead accept intelligence for what it is: a product of limited quality and value based largely on information obtained by special technical or clandestine means. It must accept the fact that it cannot *rely* on the intelligence analyst for warning, current intelligence, or estimation, but can only ask him for a contribution proportionate to the number of analysts and supporting resources he is provided.

Fortunately, there are indications that the President-elect's national security advisors—such as Richard Abshire, Richard Allen, and John Lehman—understand this, and the need to create a new process of "fusion" between intelligence and the other wide-ranging analytic and data gathering activities of the United States. They have already talked about strengthening the role of the State Department as the coordinator of all foreign policy data, and moving the National Security Council back to its proper role as the coordinator of national security activities.

In the case of intelligence, strong new management systems will be needed which force the intelligence community to act as one part of a joint effort to develop warning, analysis, and estimation. Intelligence data must be made to reach all of the potential users, and not funneled upward in an effort to use the power of special access to reach the senior officials and the President. The primary responsibility for analysis must also lie outside the intelligence community and be formally placed in the State Department, Department of Defense, and other user agencies. They must be charged with blending intelligence data, routine classified data, and the vast sources of open source or unclassified information available through the media and the reporting activities of modern government.

This will be a painful process, and one which is certain to be an anathema to most traditional intelligence officers. It means, in effect, that they must not only lose their mystique, but their ability to hide behind the barrier of special clearances. It means they will be accepted only

for what they can contribute, and not for what they claim or can hide.

It also means that the next Director of Central Intelligence and/or Director of the CIA must be ruthlessly subordinated to intelligence users, and that a firm end must be put to the idea of making him the direct advisor to the President. This idea has turned director after director into a competitor for quasi-Cabinet status, when he should have concentrated on being the manager of a \$15-billion plus activity of government designed to serve all users. It has trapped intelligence into reaching far beyond its capabilities, and the DCI into trying to become a "superanalyst," regardless of the impossibility of his ever acquiring the necessary range of expertise to be the arbiter of what is right or wrong on every topic.

(The problem is exemplified by the quality of analysis on Soviet and US strategic forces evident when the present DCI told one group on November 19th: "... the hard facts are that we both have oodles and oodles of capability.")

Intelligence and the Need for "Fusion"

The Reagan Administration must also put an end to the present system of "code-word" security classifications that now so restrict access to most key intelligence that much of it is wasted, and which simultaneously flag exactly where it comes from, and its sensitivity. While it is proper and necessary to limit access to unique intelligence sources, it is absurd to reduce the circulation of intelligence information in the manner that now takes place, and then use special security classifications which help a potential enemy more than they protect a source.

(Not long ago, Stansfield Turner called a former associate who had retired after a distinguished military career and asked him to do "about four days" of consulting work, reporting directly to Turner. Turner asked the officer to take an independent look at the intelligence community's whole security classification and code-word system, and try to systematically relate code-words to sources and to users. The four day job which Turner had estimated turned out to take four months. At the end of it, the officer sat down with Turner and laid out a huge chart, a complete matrix each of whose entries he had personally penned in. On one axis were all the code-words and sources; on the other were all the users, those cleared for the information compared with those who really needed it; and in the corresponding boxes was a description of the subject matter. Turner was extremely pleased with the product—until the officer told him of two problems. For one thing, the officer himself and Turner were not cleared to know of some of the entries he had made. Second, there wasn't much either of them could do with the chart, since no one at CIA was cleared to even reproduce it, much less study or comment on it. Out of that study eventually grew the "Royal"

special security system which was unveiled this summer, unfortunately on the front pages of *The New York Times* and *Washington Evening Star*, even before Turner had a chance to finish briefing all of the Congressional committees concerned with it.)

For all its talk and statistics, the intelligence community has made almost no real progress in this area. It has simply distributed the chaff while continuing to codeword the wheat. It still tries to use its special channels as a means of obtaining power, influence, and access to key decision-makers. It continuously and massively abuses the codeword system, and layers ever more complex and cumbersome data handling systems on the user. While the "Apex" and "Royal" systems invented by Stansfield Turner—but almost universally protested by the rest of the intelligence community—symbolize such abuse, so does the widespread use of special codewords such as ORCON, which was designed to allow access to permanent federal employees but not to contractors, and Service-oriented codewords which seem designed to allow access to the Navy but not the other military Services, to allow access to NSA analysts, but not analysts outside NSA, etc. Such fusion must also take place at many different levels, and not simply at the top.

What is needed is to carefully restrict the limited amount of raw intelligence data that really does reveal its exact source, while integrating virtually all of the present "codeword" products into forms which can be handled by normal standards of security classification. We need to give the intelligence user and producer access to the same integrated mix of data and analysis.

For example, we must make our embassies into real "country teams" through the fusion of all activities of the various official US representatives in a given nation. We must eliminate the present fight over access to information that divides virtually every US embassy in the world, that compartments reporting and thinking, relies on back channels and special reporting systems, and simply feeds inter-agency jealousies. We must enforce the fact that similar fusion is needed in the major military commands, and in each major department and agency. And, equal attention must be given in implementing this "fusion" to making the user of intelligence communicate with the intelligence community. No intelligence analyst or organization can provide proper warning, analysis, or estimation if he is "blindsided" by a policymaker who does not communicate what he is doing and the data he obtained. Far too many intelligence analysts now claim their only insight into policy is what they read in the *Washington Post*. The flow of information must work both ways and be collegial. "Fusion" does not mean using intelligence simply as a data base, or a one-way flow of data.

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The Importance of Net Assessment

This, in turn, means a new integrative effort is needed to bring the intelligence community and the user together, and make them report and analyze in common terms. The "rebirth" of the Board of Estimates concept under the name of the National Intelligence Council, and moving Bruce Clarke to the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) have helped, but it is not enough.

The current analytic and estimative operations of the US government are incredibly inefficient. They produce threat estimates by intelligence officers who often lack a realistic enough understanding of the capabilities of US forces to make meaningful comparisons of factors like technical performance, readiness, etc. They produce countless studies of US forces which virtually ignore the threat. They leave comparative analysis largely to contractors outside the process of government. Worst of all, most key R&D, programming, budget, and policy decisions are only tied to the most shallow analysis of their impact on the balance or foreign affairs if such analysis is performed at all.

The nation does not need compartmented intelligence estimates which report only on the intelligence community's view of the trends in Soviet forces. It instead needs "net assessments": combined analysis of US capabilities, threat capabilities, and allied/neutral capabilities, which are presented in assessments and estimates which force rigorous comparability and objectivity. The user must cease to get data on the threat, but not our allies.

In fairness to Turner, he recognized some of these problems and tried to introduce more comparisons of Soviet and US forces into NIE-11-3-8, only to meet violent opposition from a Department of Defense which did not trust his objectivity. This, however, is inevitable when net assessment is attempted by a service organization like intelligence.

The "red side"/"blue side" division of the nation's security thought processes can only be ended if the key estimative tasks are removed from the intelligence community and conducted in the form of net assessments by some office within the State Department or the National Security Council. The present net assessment offices in the Department of Defense need strengthening and revitalization, and similar offices will be needed in other key elements of government. At the same time, key policy and budgeting decisions should be tied to an explicit analysis of how they impact on the balance in a given region or theater, and should be directly linked to this net assessment process.

The Need for a Strong Input from the Outside

For similar reasons, the intelligence community should have strong outside advice and review at virtually every level. The PIAB may not have been fully successful

in providing such advice, and its far more limited successor, the Senior Review Panel, has been little more than an in-house mockery of what is needed.

The PIAB failed, however, because it lacked the staff support it needed, and its members lacked consistent quality. It worked when it had strong, active, senior members like Land and Teller, and when it had the independent staff work it needed. The much more limited Senior Review Board is a failure because it deals only with national estimates and inter-agency papers, and its members are relatively unimportant, have no real independent careers, and must rely on the CIA for day-to-day support.

Successor groups must be composed of strong outside personalities representing a suitably diverse range of options, their advice must be targeted as much towards the user of intelligence as the intelligence professional, they must have strong and

The present Intelligence Community Staff represents a concept which is largely unworkable.

independent staffs, and there must be no willingness on the part of the community's managers to tolerate stonewalling or blindsiding of such groups.

What is needed is a hierarchy of outside review groups that will overcome the parochialism inevitable in organizations composed of professionals with a lifetime career pattern working in a highly specialized and classified area, and which act to ensure the process of fusion and change needed to make intelligence efficient and effective. Further, such outside advisory groups are needed by the DIA, NSA, NRO, and the other key elements of intelligence, and not simply by the DCI and CIA. Again, the focus should be on ensuring the proper services of all users, and breaking up the over-centralization of the last few years.

The Need for Independent and Competing Analysis

The analytic process also needs to be kept decentralized, and made as competitive as possible. No single behavioral aspect of the intelligence community has been as consistently absurd, and led to so many dismal and damaging intelligence failures, as the search to unify all of the community around a single "best" estimate. The end result has inevitably been to bury valid differences, make the DCI into a judge of issues in areas where he has no competence, and/or force the intelligence product into a bland or lowest common denominator product.

The time has come to recognize that users can easily sort through a wide range of opinions—and will do so using the newspapers if they can get no better mix of opinion and analysis—but cannot consider views and opinions they do not receive.

The time has come to recognize that CIA, DIA, NSA, and every other element of the intelligence community should not only be allowed to compete and surface differences, but be encouraged to do so. And, the time has come to adopt management systems which force such competition, which reward successful analysis regardless of the source, and which penalize censorship and failure. The US does not need theocratic management of its intelligence efforts; it needs men who can react to Descartes, Mills, and Hegel and the lessons regarding the need for dialectics and intellectual competition which have characterized the evolution of Western thought processes over the last two hundred years.

Giving the Intelligence Community Staff Either a "Mercy Killing" or Major Reform

Accepting open, user-oriented competition within the intelligence community should allow the new Administration to make some immediate savings in intelligence personnel and expenditures. The present Intelligence Community Staff represents a concept which is largely unworkable. It does have potential value in ensuring suitable coordination in the development of national collection assets, and it may be useful as a general center of coordination within the intelligence community. However, its present staffing and responsibilities are symbolic of the attempts to over-centralize the intelligence process that has gone on in recent years. The IC Staff has been put in charge of collection tasking and intelligence budgeting when this should more properly be left to the user.

The present IC Staff should be cut significantly, and many of its responsibilities should be assigned to the Department of Defense and the individual intelligence agencies. They represent one of the most overpaid and ineffective groups in Washington, and even if the concept of the IC Staff were sound, they are scarcely the proper people to make it work.

This is exemplified by the "worst case" example of a senior deputy who used his position on the IC Staff in 1979 to help raise his mistress from GS-11 to near supergrade status, but then had to ask her to quietly leave town when this threatened to become an open scandal—a move whose value was somewhat diminished when the family who rented her house discovered a stack of codeword documents in her closet.

However, the problems in the IC Staff are much broader. The IC Staff is composed of contract personnel rather than the active intelligence career professionals who served on rotational assignments under Colby and Bush. This has brought in far too many men who do not know the trade while grossly over-promoting others who have left their parent intelligence services. It lacks active military members, and has far too many retirees. At the same time, it is sufficiently divorced from the

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user of the intelligence product so that it has never been able to set the proper goals and objectives and give its 245 odd members real purpose.

What is needed is a staff about half this size which mixes rotational assignments of active career intelligence professionals and users, which serves solely in a coordinating role, and which reviews the product as an independent voice or "devil's advocate" rather than a manager. In this case, "less" is definitely "more."

De-Centralizing Collection Planning

The Collection Tasking Staff (CTS) should be one of the first elements of the IC Staff to be restructured as part of this reform. The CTS not only has not worked, it has been a bureaucratic nightmare. What is needed is to return it to a coordination role based on committees which mix agency personnel and strong outside and user review. This could be accomplished by making the CTS into a "Coordination Staff," returning to the committee system in place in 1976, and adding an outside advisory body of representatives from major user departments and agencies.

The Need to Rethink Collection Priorities and Means

Priority must be given to rethinking the current priorities for developing collection systems, and the weight of effort given to national versus dedicated systems, and technical means versus humint. The present national collection effort is so heavily weighted toward national technical means that it has forced the military into creating a host of parallel theater and tactical systems under the name of reconnaissance, targeting, and battlefield surveillance and management. Rather than saving money, two parallel technical collection systems have been created for intelligence and our military forces, which are not integrated, and which serve no one well, at vastly greater total cost.

At the same time, NASA's gross mismanagement of the space shuttle, coupled with that of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, has created a crisis in terms of future space lift. This has been further exacerbated by a failure to fund enough photint and sigint satellites. This virtually forces the Reagan Administration into rethinking of the present shuttle/booster program, satellite development, and non-space asset mix, almost regardless of whether it wishes to address the problem or not. It should treat this as an opportunity to consider both how users can be given back dedicated assets and how to restructure the mix of techint and humint.

Although the figures are classified, there has been a steady reduction in humint capabilities for almost two decades. No matter how technically impressive, the wrong picture is not worth a thousand words. The community's dismal failure in initially understanding the damage to Iranian and Iraqi oil facilities has proved

this once again within the last month. No photo or sigint intercept can substitute for direct, on-the-scene knowledge of the key actors in a given country or region. No matter how spectacular a photo or signal intercept may be, it cannot reveal enough about plans, intentions, internal political dynamics, economics, etc. There are simply too many cases where photos are ambiguous or useless, and sigint may drown the analyst in partial or conflicting information. Accordingly, the current shortage of boosters and satellites also offers an opportunity for adding humint resources back into the intelligence structures rather than simply bringing more technical means systems as soon as possible.

Say It's "C'I," and to Hell With It!

This is an equally opportune moment to give the concept of "C'I" a permanent pink slip. Like most of the super-integrative and centralization efforts of the last four years, the end result has been to create

Covert action is not only *not* the answer to everything, but it is generally so high in risk that it fails.

unimplementable systems which over-centralize without meaningful cost savings. The "C'I" concept has created a host of failure-prone "netting" systems which almost ensure that something goes wrong in a crisis, and it has simultaneously reduced the number of dedicated and redundant (read survivable) assets throughout the nation's defense system.

Instead of being a "force multiplier," the Carter Administration's concept of C'I has proved a hopeless force diminisher. The much publicized, and totally unsuccessful, WWMCCS is only the worst such C'I "net." Such over-integrated systems are beginning to abound through the nation's warning, command, and intelligence organizations, and their practical effect is to deafen the nation's crisis managers with the sound of "crashing" computers. The nation does not need this kind of "high tech," and it can be abolished without any protest from most of its users. Who, after all, would mourn anyone responsible for WWMCCS?

Clandestine Operations and Counterintelligence

The new Administration has already made its intention clear to restore the nation's capabilities for clandestine operations, and to improve its counterintelligence capabilities. Both are vital actions, and both require new approaches to organizing US intelligence:

- Several other countries now separate their clandestine intelligence gathering activities from their "black operations" capabilities. They do so because of the in-

evitable problems of trying to combine both types of operations, control them, and give each activity proper priority. Many countries link their clandestine operations activities to special military units which are trained to back up the civil intelligence operators, and create a smooth hierarchy of "black" capabilities which can escalate from individual action to paramilitary intervention.

The US should follow these models, and create a new clandestine operations service with a fixed age limit and selection process, and close ties to the various special services in the military. Previous CIA "black" operations activity inevitably buried clandestine intelligence gathering under the effort to expand operations, fought with the military instead of cooperating with it, and eventually produced a service loaded with "burnt out" cases as its members aged without being subject to selection out.

At the same time, the Reagan Administration must clearly recognize that covert action is not only *not* the answer to everything, but it is generally so high in risk that it fails. The US must put its new service under tight Presidential control and avoid any reinforcement of the risk-taking tendency of its covert intelligence service by similar minds in the military. It must exercise the ruthless professional caution of a Richard Helms, and avoid the half-blind optimism of Allen Dulles, Robert Kennedy, and Richard Bissell.

- At the same time, the US needs an integrated counterintelligence effort. The past effort ended with the CIA attempting to make itself into "moles" as its counterintelligence officers fought to target management and each other. It also has a half century tradition of feuding with the FBI, preceeding even the formation of the OSS.

The new Administration needs to create a separate foreign counterintelligence service that has strong outside controls, which has tight and friendly relations with the FBI, and which fully uses the intercept activities of NSA and the other sigint agencies, to ensure suitable coordination. It also needs to expand its coverage from Soviet bloc and other communist targets to "friendly" services—like those of France and Israel—and neutral services like Iran and Libya.

Finding a Method to Communicate Intelligence Without Destroying It

Finally, the new Administration must find a viable compromise between the hidden intelligence fortresses of the 1950s, and the nightmare of leaks and FOI requests of the 1970s. It needs to communicate to the public and the Congress what intelligence is doing in a manner that both reassures the public that intelligence has proper supervision, and shows the public how much intelligence can accomplish.

(During an unclassified public congressional subcommittee hearing early this fall, the subcommittee chairman interrupted the Pentagon's senior intelligence policy

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official, Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, to challenge one of his statements. The chairman said something like [the paraphrase is necessary because the official transcript has yet to be printed and AEP's notes are not more precise]: "Now, wait a minute, Admiral. I don't think that can be right. Just before this hearing opened, we had a very highly classified briefing by the intelligence people and this new security system 'Royal' or 'Apex' or

let's see, what's the word we're not supposed to reveal?" Admiral Murphy calmly told him, "The word we're not supposed to use in public, Mr. Chairman, is 'Royal.'")

In terms of overall legal protection and security, this can best be accomplished by drawing a careful and defensible line that guards only those aspects of intelligence which must have privacy. The names of intelligence operatives, and the nature of special intelligence means, must have full legal protection. At the same time, most details of intelligence organization, budget, etc. do not need protection, and any effort to so do will degrade the legal rationale for keeping secrets that must be kept.

In terms of relations with the Congress, the narrow legal interpretation of executive authority that says only the Executive can task intelligence, but not the Congress, needs a more generous interpretation. This can be accomplished by freeing a limited range of the total intelligence effort for tasking by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, by greatly expanding the circulation of non-sensitive intelligence reports to Congress, and by making available the results of the net assessment ef-

fort. Such inputs could be provided both in the form of separate reports and as justification for key budgets like those of the Defense Department. Such steps would ensure that Congress saw the product of intelligence in a form which would serve the national interest far better than the endless rounds of special hearings and queries which now take place.

Finally, much better reporting is needed of unclassified intelligence products to the American people. The best substitute for the Freedom of Information request is to provide as much open reporting as possible. This will show what intelligence is doing and, at the same time, communicate the trends in the threat and key international developments. Such reporting will also provide "warning," and help develop a national consensus around the national security actions the US must take.

The True Challenge in Intelligence: Innovation, Not Senility

This is a demanding set of challenges for intelligence reform. In effect, the new Administration must simultaneously heal the intelligence community and make it grow. It will do the nation little good to simply make intelligence what it was be-

fore Vietnam, Watergate, and Stansfield Turner. The intelligence community was deeply ill long before the current series of crises made its symptoms public.

The task is rather to shift the focus of intelligence away from the isolation and almost cult-like secrecy that evolved out of the OSS days, and from the "black and white" world of the cold war. It is to create an overall structure for intelligence that is a fully integrated part of the national security process. Intelligence must be re-structured to deal with the much more sophisticated challenges, threats, and world we now face. In fact, the only thing worse for intelligence than its slow murder under Stansfield Turner would be to let it die of senility.

Justin Galen is the pen name of a former senior Department of Defense civilian official.